

SOUTH KOREA: ARE NEW METHODS MORE AMENABLE TO NEW INTEREST?

**A MONOGRAPH
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Infantry**



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SECOND TERM AY 96-97

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19971107 042

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE <i>22 May 97</i>		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <i>SOUTH KOREA - ARE NEW METHODS MORE AMENABLE TO NEW INTERESTS?</i>				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) <i>MAT THOMAS D. WEBB</i>					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027				10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED					
14. SUBJECT TERMS				15. NUMBER OF PAGES <i>59</i>	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED		

THIS QUALITY INFORMATION


SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL


Major Thomas D. Webb

Title of Monograph: *South Korea: Are New Methods More
Amenable to new Interest?*


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Accepted this 22d Day of May 1997

Abstract

SOUTH KOREA: ARE NEW METHODS MORE AMENABLE TO NEW INTERESTS? by MAJ Thomas D. Webb, USA, 54 pages.

United States Army forces have been stationed in South Korea since the signing of the armistice in 1953. The intent of the forces was to contain the spread of communism and provide the United States with a security arc to protect her western borders. Since 1953, several changes have occurred with respect to the Southwest Asia Region. United States Army doctrine has changed, with National Strategy, from containment and forward presence to force projection. In addition, though North Korea still poses a formidable threat to regional stability, South Korea maintains an improved military force capable of executing a credible defense along the 38th Parallel. Furthermore, the United States has additional interests in the Pacific Rim generated by the economic prosperity of the entire Pacific Rim. The purpose of this paper is to determine if United States Army forces should remain in South Korea. It is the author's contention that a static defense in South Korea is no longer consistent with Army doctrine. Furthermore, the Army could better support national interests in the region by developing contingencies for deployment from CONUS sites or other Pacific military installations.

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SECTION I: Introduction

Since the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, the United States has stationed military forces in South Korea to assist in that country's defense. At that time, one of the United States major interests was to stop the spread of communism. With North Korea receiving substantial military support from the former Soviet Union and China, the US sought to maintain military parity by providing South Korea with a formidable military force.

Several factors relating to US military presence changed during the last 44 years. A comparison of some of these factors includes:

1953	1997
North Korean military forces were twice as large as South Korean military forces.	South Korea enjoys relative military parity with North Korea.
The United States' primary interest in Korea was the containment of communism.	The United States wants to maintain stability in Southwest Asia to profit from the Pacific Rim's booming economy.
The Soviet Union supplied North Korea with large amounts of military equipment and several military advisors.	The Soviet Union no longer exists. China limits sales of armaments to North Korea due to economic instability in North Korea.

US military presence on the continent continues to enhance stability on the peninsula. However, these forces were never intended to be a permanent fixture. Though there are legitimate reasons to retain them in Korea, there are strong arguments that support their redeployment.

The purpose of this study is to determine if changes in the Southwest Asian region should serve as a basis for revised policies for Korea. Regarding stated national interests

and current military strategy and doctrine, the author intends to assess the need for United States Army forces in South Korea. The intent is to determine if the Army can remove forces stationed in Korea and develop deployment contingencies from other areas in the region or CONUS. To analyze this concept the author will use strategic and operational military criteria as well as relevant characteristics from other instruments of military power.

The methodology the author uses to conduct his analysis includes a geographic and demographics analysis of the Korean peninsula, a review of the events preceding and United States participation in the Korean War, and analyses of several factors relating to United States military presence in the region. The author uses the final section to determine degree of change from 1950 to 1997 for each of these factors.

The reader must first understand the geographic and demographic characteristics of the region. Section II contains a terrain analysis of North and South Korea including its effects on military operations. The author then reviews the history of Korea from 1700 to 1950. This period is significant because the Korean people transformed from a homogeneous society to two distinct nations.

It is also important to understand how and why the United States became involved in Korea. In Section III, the author reviews the Korean War and its causes. Important concepts in this section include multilateral participation, South Korean dependence on the United States, and United States' interests and investments in the region. These factors will provide a basis for an analysis of changes.

Considering this foundation, Section IV consists of an analysis of three areas to determine the degree of change. These areas include:

- a. United States Army doctrine.
- b. United States' interests in Korea and Southwest Asia.
- c. North and South Korea's economic, socio-political, and military dispositions.

In Section V, the author uses the results of Section IV to determine if continued United States military presence in South Korea:

- a. supports United States interests in Southwest Asia.
- b. is consistent with current Army doctrine.
- c. is necessary to maintain stability in the region.
- d. is feasible given Army missions and preparedness.

Through this analysis, the author intends to determine if United States Army forces are still needed in Korea or if national interests would be better served by the development of CONUS based contingencies.




SECTION II: Introduction to Korea

Two factors that add to the uniqueness of the Korean peninsula are its geography and its demography. They play an important part of any military analysis of the region. From a geographic standpoint, the peninsula's terrain severely limits the use of various weapons systems, e.g. tanks. Demographically, Korea was once a homogeneous society. Outside forces divided the country into North and South Korea, creating two distinct, yet similar,

cultures. To understand Korean conflict and modern day Korea, one must understand the theater in terms of geography and the formation of the Korean culture.

A. Geography

The Korean Peninsula is approximately the size of the area encompassing Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland. It covers a total of 85,000 square miles, measuring 500 miles in length and 135 miles in



width.¹ The countries of North and South Korea are roughly equal in size. South Korea covers 98,480 square kilometers of land with 290 square kilometers of water surface. North Korea covers 120,540 square kilometers of land with 140 square kilometers of water surface. Whereas South Korea only has land boundaries with North Korea, North Korea borders China for 1673 kilometers, South Korea for 238 kilometers and Russia for 19 kilometers. South Korea possesses 2416 kilometers of coastline while the North has 2495 kilometers.² The combined coastline on the peninsula, not including the countries' islands, is about the size of the United States' Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastlines. The terrain in North Korea contains many hills and mountains with deep valleys. Relative to

the North, South Korea is flatter with fewer hills. A mountain range runs along the east side of the peninsula and each country has coastal plains in their western sections.³

B. Korean Culture

Though the Korean people traditionally advocated an isolationist philosophy, the influence of major countries in the western and eastern world significantly impacted on the forming of their culture. In just over a decade, the Korea changed from an isolated to an exploited region. Three events characterized this trend. They included the introduction of Christianity, the emergence of international trade, and subjugation by Japan.

The introduction of Christianity occurred in the late 18th century. The first Catholic priest to enter Korea in 1794 marked this event.⁴ The occasion was significant because it constituted the first breach in Korean isolationism.

The emergence of international trade also changes Korean culture. The conclusion of the British-China War in 1842 opened several ports in China for British trade ships. In 1847, the British demonstrated an interest in Korea and unsuccessfully sought to negotiate trade agreements with the country. Korea was beginning to experience pressure for trade from several other countries, as well. With its annexation of Manchuria in 1865, Russia attempted to establish trading posts along the Tumen River.⁵

Having adopted an industrialist philosophy after the Civil War, the United States also demonstrated an interest in Korea. In fact, the United States was the first foreign power to negotiate trade agreements with the country. A Navy officer, Robert Schufeldt, was the US representative credited with success in negotiations with Korea. Sympathetic to Korea's previous isolationist position and its relationship with China, Schufeldt was able

to coordinate a treaty on 22 May 1882. Acknowledging his relationship with China in the treaty, Korean King Kojong stated, "The King of Korea acknowledges that Korea is a tributary of China, but in regard to both internal administration and foreign intercourse, it enjoys complete independence."⁶ Schufeldt's success effectively marked the end of Korea's isolationist character. Throughout the next century, several countries descended upon the peninsula. External influences would not end with simple trade agreements.

In response to the Russo-Japanese War, the Korean government issued a manifesto of neutrality on 21 January 1904. However, the Japanese refused to acknowledge it. After destroying Russian ships in the Port of Inchon, the Japanese Army landed at Pusan and Inchon. On 23 February 1904, they forced Korea to sign a Protocol of Alliance, ostensibly to "guarantee Korean independence", but more importantly to "accord to Japan permission to take any steps necessary to combat either foreign or domestic threats to Korea." The result of the second clause was that Korea had to "provide facilities for Japanese forces at 'such places as many by necessary' anywhere in the peninsula."⁷ Japan eventually established a protectorate over the country in 1905 and annexed it in August 1910. They began a ruthless campaign to indoctrinate the Koreans to Japanese culture, intent on ostracizing them from their ancient culture.⁸ They also filled the North with heavy industry to support a growing Japanese industrial base. They continued this process until they were defeated in 1945 at the end of World War II.

SECTION III: United States Involvement in Korea

A. Interests Following World War II

Even before the Japanese defeat, the United States began working on the future of Asia. At the Cairo Declaration in December 1943, the United States, Britain, and China each collectively acknowledged that they were “mindful of the enslavement of the of the people of Korea . . . in due course they shall become free and independent.”⁹

They reaffirmed their conviction at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, this time with the Soviet Union. The United States wanted a freely elected government in Korea because of America’s desire to foster a democratic environment as well as a need to establish a buffer between its western coast and communist regimes.¹⁰

The Truman administration established a security arc that extended from Alaska through the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, and the Mariannas. The administration established the arc because of a growing concern over Soviet dominance and influence in China, Manchuria, and the northern half of Korea. The area contained in this arc would provide air and naval bases for operations against the Soviets in Vladivostok and Manchuria, if required. Conversely, the Soviets wanted to establish a buffer zone in Manchuria, protecting the port city of Vladivostok and the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and negating Japan’s ability to seal the Sea of Japan.¹¹

In accordance with agreements at Cairo and Potsdam, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to supervise the removal of Japanese military forces from the Korean Peninsula. “The 38th Parallel was designated as a temporary line of demarcation to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea. To ensure that US interests in the

area were met, the United States attempted to gain Soviet acceptance of the Moscow Agreement of 1945 which would establish a provisional Korean Democratic Government.” Characteristically, the Soviets would not agree to the terms of the agreement. They claimed that the “United States alone had violated the Moscow agreement and had blocked the independence of Korea. It [the Soviets] offered a counter proposition for mutual withdrawal of occupying troops as the first step and organization of a national government as the second.”¹²

The United States solicited the assistance of the United Nations (UN) to resolve the problem. The UN established a temporary commission “to supervise the election of Korean Representatives who would draft a democratic constitution and form a government.” The Soviets refused to attend any of the meetings to coordinate the elections and would not allow the North Koreans to attend.¹³

It was apparent that the Soviets did not simply intend to clear Japanese forces from the northern portion of the peninsula. Rather, they exploited their occupation of the area to solidify their own national objectives. They established “frontier outposts and patrols and halted passage across the parallel.”¹⁴ Regardless of the Russian actions, the US intended to honor previous agreements. On 7 September 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, speaking in Yokohama, Japan, presented General Order No. 1 to the people of the peninsula’s southern area. He reiterated the President’s commitment to end enslavement, stating:

Having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and the determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Korean people are assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the instrument of surrender and to protect them in their personal and religious rights. In giving effect to these purposes, your active aid and compliance are required.¹⁵

US forces facilitated the conduct of free elections on 10 May 1948 and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was founded on 15 August 1948.¹⁶ In June 1949, the US withdrew its forces from Korea. Five hundred United States military personnel remained in South Korea to form a military advisory group. The US also left military equipment, mostly small arms and light naval craft, to outfit approximately 50,000 soldiers. The equipment had a replacement value of \$110,000,000.¹⁷

It is ironic that "at no time did the US contemplate that the 38th Parallel would permanently divide the country." Nevertheless, the inauguration of the Communist People's Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) occurred on 9 September 1948.¹⁸ By forming this organization, the North Koreans could eliminate United States influence in the region and unify Korea under a communist regime. Throughout the remainder of the 1948, the North Koreans advertised that their intentions were to drive the "American Imperialists" from South Korea. The Soviets claimed that they withdrew their occupation forces in December 1948, but they would not allow the UN to verify the claim.¹⁹ From September 1948 until June 1950, the North Koreans conducted border raids, conducted guerrilla actions, disseminated propaganda, and attempted to negatively impact on South Korea's economy. "Thus the 38th Parallel, a fortuitous line resulting from the exigencies of the war, had become a political frontier."²⁰ The stage was set for the Korean conflict.

B. The War

1. The North Korean Offensive

At 4 o'clock in the morning Sunday, June 25, Korean time, armed forces from North Korea commenced an unprovoked assault against the territory of the Republic of Korea. This assault was launched by ground forces along the thirty-eighth parallel, in the Ongjin, Kaesong, and Chunson sectors, and by amphibious landings on the east coast in the vicinity of Jangmung. In addition, North Korean aircraft have attacked and strafed the Kimpo airport in the outskirts of Seoul.

Under the circumstance I have described, this wholly illegal and unprovoked attack by the North Korean forces, in the view of my Government, constitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression.

Statement by United States representative to the United Nations on June 25 1950²¹

The North Koreans conducted a surprise attack into South Korea on 25 June 1950 at 0400 hours. They used a heavy artillery concentration to facilitate movement of their ground forces southward on three primary routes. The main effort, directed against Seoul, moved on the Pongchon-Uijongbu and Yonchon-Uijongbu corridors. Supporting efforts moved in the West through Kaesong-Munsan and in the East towards Chunchon.²² The North Korean attack was, with few exceptions, successful along the entire front. The North Koreans captured Seoul on 28 June 1950 and continued to press their attack to the South. They reached the Han River on 30 June 1950 and were delayed by effective ROK defenses.²³

The South had recovered from the shock of the North's surprise and demonstrated a limited capability for combat. However, after moving a tank force across the Han River, the North was able to resume their attack to the South.²⁴ Their intent was to capture critical ports, like Pusan, to deny deployment of external military powers like the United States. The South Korean Army, although largely destroyed, continued to fight with whatever means it had and succeeded in delaying the North Korean attack to the south.

2. United Nations Response

Upon notification of the invasion, the United States immediately sought assistance from the United Nations Security Council. The council, acknowledging that South Korea was the only legitimate government on the peninsula (based on their resolution of October 1949), issued a three part statement concerning the attack. Specifically, their statement 1) called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of North Korea to the 38th Parallel, 2) requested the UN observe this withdrawal to ensure compliance, and 3) granted authorization for UN members to assist in the execution of the resolution.²⁵ Two days later, the Council issued a resolution recommending that “members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area”.²⁶

On 7 July, the UN adopted a resolution calling for a unified command to be established in Korea. As the UN asked the United States to designate a commander-in-chief, Truman appointed MacArthur to lead the UN coalition.²⁷ By 30 June 1950, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, China, and the Netherlands announced that they would provide assistance. Throughout the war, Belgium, Britain, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Turkey provided military forces to the unified command.²⁸ The US Army units in the command were primarily represented by the Eighth US Army.

3. UN and US Counteroffensive

As units of the Eighth Army arrived through Pusan, MacArthur committed troops northward to assist in the ROK's fledgling withdrawal. Ultimately, he would establish a defensive perimeter around the Port of Pusan. Having established a defense capable of

halting the North Korean's southern movement, MacArthur used the period from August to September to build combat power through the Port of Pusan.²⁹

In September 1950, MacArthur was ready to conduct an amphibious assault at Inchon. The intent of the operation was to simultaneously cut the North Korean's LOCs and escape routes through the routes they originally attacked on vicinity Seoul. He conducted the assault with one Marine division and one Army Corps. Simultaneously, the remainder of UN forces, consisting predominantly of Eighth Army and ROK divisions attacked from the Pusan Perimeter northward to effect a pincer movement. By 26 October 1953, UN forces established hasty defensive positions vicinity the Yalu River as the North Koreans retreated over the Manchurian border.³⁰

4. Chinese Intervention

In November 1950, the People's Republic of China (PRC) formed a coalition with DPRK.³¹ The communists attacked and retook Seoul. Subsequent counteroffensive operations by the UN forces returned Seoul to South Korea by July 1951. The next nine months consisted of a seesaw battle in which opposing forces, UNC and PRC, attacked and withdrew in response to the their adversaries' actions.

5. The Armistice Talks

June 1951 saw the initiation of armistice talks. The opposing forces occupied relatively static defensive positions around the 38th Parallel, engaging in desparate small unit actions for very limited objectives, but not attempting any major offensives. In July 1953, UN and North Korean officials signed the armistice agreement marking the end of hostilities but not the end of the war.³²

C. The Armistice to 1997

The shooting war on the peninsula ended with the armistice in 1953, but the armistice did not bring peace. Officially, the countries involved in the original conflict were still at war. The next 45 years demonstrated that though North Korea agreed to a pause, they had not given up the fight. To protect its interests on the peninsula, the US entered into a long term treaty to ensure the existence of a free, democratic South Korea.

The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 contained several core articles that demonstrated the US commitment to South Korea. The treaty arranged the following:

- A United States force permanently stationed in South Korea, United States Forces Korea (USFK)
- Consultation on military defense matters
- Military aid to South Korea
- Guaranteed US support to the government in the event of another attack. (The treaty implied an attack by North Korea but the wording of the document refers to any attack).³³

In addition to the arrangements of the treaty, the National Security Council agreed to provide South Korea with financial aid for damages suffered during the conflict. National Security Council Resolution 156/1 provided up to \$1 billion in order to maintain South Korea's Army, resurrect the pre-conflict standard of living, reconstruct the country's infrastructure, and invest in programs to entice reunification efforts.³⁴ The long range objective of the National Security Council (NSC) was:

“to bring about the unification of Korea with a self supporting economy and under a free, independent and representative government, friendly towards the United States, with its political and territorial integrity assured by international agreement and capable of defending Korean territory short of an attack by a major power.”³⁵

South Korean President Rhee was reluctant to agree to the terms of the armistice and the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty, stating that he did not trust the North.³⁶ Many believed, however, that reunification was his goal at any cost. They theorized that he intended to use the United States to assist him in achieving this goal. This idea impacted on the United States' goal of decreasing its commitments to South Korea.

The South Korean and United States' administrators did not enjoy a shared vision. Therefore, efforts to increase South Korea's self-defense capabilities were severely hampered. Furthermore, the United States did not have a detailed plan to affect decreased commitments. They did not establish any measures of success to gauge potential for troop withdrawals. However, over the next 40 years, four reductions in United States military forces occurred. Each reduction triggered opposition from the Korean government.

1. The First Reduction

In December 1953, the United States began its first withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. President Eisenhower announced the redeployment of 2 divisions. Simultaneously, he warned China that any further invasions would result in United States bombing campaigns against that country. The withdrawal still left eight United States divisions with 327,000 soldiers on the peninsula. Fourteen ROK divisions with 450,000 soldiers also supported the defense of the South.³⁷

2. The Second Reduction

By August 1954, six more US divisions redeployed, leaving their equipment for ROK forces under an agreement arranged by General Van Fleet in May 1954. This reduction caused a lot of debate in both the US and Korean administrations about the seemingly

rapid withdrawal from the area. Some American policy makers thought the withdrawal should not begin until reconstruction efforts were complete. The Koreans, fearful of the aggressive North and unsure of their own strength, staged demonstrations to condemn the exitus.

Nevertheless, by the end of 1954, things seemed to be going according to plan. The Korean Army, continuously building combat power, possessed 19 divisions organized into 5 corps. The Korean Army also assumed control of most of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Remaining United States forces consisted of I Corps, Eighth Army, with the 24th Infantry Division and the 7th Infantry Division, and various artillery, air defense, logistics and support groups. Total United States personnel amounted to 50,000 soldiers.³⁸

As a result of South Korea's reluctance, American policymakers began to think that the South Koreans were overdependent on the US military. In an NSC policy letter in August 1957, the Eisenhower administration published its intentions of:

- "Encouraging the ROK in the further development of stable democratic institutions and of cooperative relations with the other free nations in Asia."
- "Influencing the ROK to conduct its foreign relations in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN charter."³⁹

The dilemma that the Eisenhower administration faced was complex. The administration was concerned about security in the Asian region, the military budget was decreasing, and ROK equipment was aging. The situation was magnified by the fact that the democratic process in South Korea was not progressing at an acceptable rate. In November 1957, Ambassador Walter Dowling reported that South Korea was riddled with political and social instability. A July 1959 NSC policy paper, published in response

to these allegations, expressed the administrations intentions to “. . . make clear to the government of the ROK the importance with which the United States views the strengthening of democratic institutions.”⁴⁰

Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s, the political and social instability continued. In April 1960, a student uprising removed President Rhee's regime from power. The country operated under a parliamentary democracy for ten months until a *coup d'etat* returned the Rhee regime to power with “authoritarian control, stricter and far more efficient than anything the country had experienced since the end of the Japanese regime.”⁴¹

In 1964, the new United States administration under President Johnson faced the recurring dilemma of maintaining democracy on the peninsula and cutting United States defense costs. That administration failed to make any reductions in United States military presence, citing increased economic developments as justification for continued support.⁴²

3. *The Third Reduction*

In the late 1960s, the United States was deeply involved in the Vietnam Conflict. This operation placed a significant burden on Army manpower resources and resurfaced the issue of support to South Korea. These demands prompted a reevaluation of the United States relationship with South Korea. As the Vietnam War concluded, the issue was scrutinized by the Nixon Administration.

According to the Nixon administration, South Korea was not as strategically important as it had been. Another conflict on the peninsula would probably not automatically trigger participation by the Soviet Union or China. The administration was willing to accept a limited conflict on the peninsula.⁴³

This admission signified a new philosophy towards the region, supported by the Nixon Doctrine. In addition to his plan to end the Vietnam War, President Nixon looked at the entire Pacific region. Nixon also recognized that Japan was becoming a major economic power in the region. The Nixon administration sought to bring stability to East Asia through a policy of 'helping others that help themselves.' In 1971, he even sent Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to China in order to mend previous relations with the communist regime of the People's Republic of China. Though the administration talked about rapprochement in the area, Korea seemed to be somewhat of an anomaly.⁴⁴

South Korea coordinated with US officials at a Security Consultative in July 1970, agreeing to accept the terms of a further withdrawal in return for increased military aid and air force assets. In March 1971, the 7th Infantry Division left Korea. I Corps changed its designation to I Corps (Group) (ROK and US) and maintained a combined staff of ROK and United States officers. United States forces remaining in Korea consisted of the 2nd Infantry Division, the 38th Air Defense Brigade, the 4th Missile Command and various support units.⁴⁵

The significance of this round of withdrawal proceedings was the South Korean reliance on the United States military. The South Korean government was adamantly against further withdrawal of US forces until they could negotiate military aid. Furthermore, even though I Corps (Group) (ROK and US) was a combined headquarters, Korean officers seemed to be "passive and dependent" on their counterparts.⁴⁶

4. The Fourth Reduction

The fourth reduction provided further evidence of South Korea's ability to influence United States policy. In 1977, the Carter administration planned significant cuts of United States troop presence in Korea. Carter justified his intentions by citing South Korea's improvements over the previous decade. South Korea's economy had risen 70% between 1965 and 1970. ROK performance in the Vietnam conflict demonstrated a real increase in the South's military capabilities.

However, in response to President Carter's plan, both Korean and United States officials vocally expressed their dissension. Though South Korea was investing 6% of its GNP in military improvements, this group claimed that North Korea, under the leadership of Kim Il Jung, had been increasing its military forces since 1945; South Korea was not near parity with North Korea on a military scale. Thus, Carter's plan met only limited success. From 1977 to 1982, the 38th Air Defense Brigade transferred its equipment to South Korea, giving it responsibility for medium and high altitude air defense. Likewise, the 4th Missile Command transferred its equipment.⁴⁷ No further significant talks of reduction would occur for several years.

SECTION IV: Changes Impacting on United States Involvement in Korea

Several areas that impact on all military operations include doctrine, United States interests relative to national security, and the ability to create credible alliances. Doctrine is important because it prescribes how the Army will fight. Planners use doctrine as the basis for several other issues including training and force composition. Identification of

national interests is important because the purpose of the army is to support national policy. For unified commanders, it is paramount to understand national interests to draft meaningful theater strategies. Finally, the Army normally tries to form alliances to conduct foreign operations. Alliances, like the one between South Korea and the United States, relieve pressures on the United States' personnel and equipment pools.

Analysis of these three areas is pertinent to a study of Korea because these factors have changed significantly over the last 40 years. The magnitude of change suggests that the placement of United States military forces in Korea is no longer required. In the following section, the author will describe changes in Army doctrine, national interests in the Pacific Rim, and North and South Korea's instruments of power. The identification of these changes will form the basis for the authors' analysis and recommendations in Section V and VI.

A. DOCTRINE - Forward Deployed to Force Projection

In addition to a volatile period for policy concerning Korea, the period from 1945 to 1997 also saw many changes in Army doctrine. Since 1976, FM 100-5, Operations, the Army's premier doctrine manual, has been rewritten four times. Each of these revisions correspond with a new way of looking at warfare. Prior to the publication of FM 100-5, Army leaders used Field Service Regulations to communicate doctrine. Between the post WWII Field Service Regulation and the 1993 FM 100-5, there were approximately ten major doctrinal changes published between the conclusion of World War II and 1993. (See Attachment 1) Though each are different, they have several characteristics in common:

- They were published as a result of observations of a recent conflict usually involving US soldiers.
- They had a major impact on the composition of the force in terms of troop composition and equipment.
- They normally focused on a major threat. The exception to this statement is the 1993 version of FM 100-5. This version addresses adversaries on a scale called the threat spectrum.

These characteristics are important because they have a profound impact on the Army as it prepares for combat. The evolution of doctrine reflected the formation of strategy concerning South Korea and United States forces stationed on the peninsula.

The author uses four periods of change to demonstrate the shift from containment to force projection. These periods include the Pentomic Era, the post-Vietnam Era, the Age of AirLand Battle, and the Post-Desert Storm Age. For each period, the reader should notice a perceived need for change coupled with a fixation on the Cold War and Europe. The European fixation is only absent from the final phase, the Post-Desert Storm Age.

1. The Pentomic Era

In 1954, the Infantry School announced that “the mass of material from Korea . . . reaffirms the soundness of US doctrine, tactics, techniques, organization, and equipment.”

⁴⁸However, the Army was concerned about fighting on an atomic battlefield. A major change in strategy, a result of Eisenhower’s election, also warranted a review of Army doctrine.

With cries of ‘No more Korea’, the American public adamantly supported Eisenhower’s defense policy of massive retaliation.⁴⁹ Strategists, influenced by the

massive potential of the Soviet and Chinese military machines, decided that nuclear systems would be the “first line defense against any creeping aggression.”⁵⁰

To fulfill this mandate, operations research agencies began to develop delivery means for tactical nuclear weapons, including the 280 millimeter gun. However, Eisenhower, like his predecessors, agreed that the primary delivery means for the nuclear trump card was the airplane. Subsequently, the Army found itself in the position of justifying its existence in the atomic age. They began to lose the fight as shown by their decreasing force levels: 1.5 million personnel and twenty divisions in 1953, 899 thousand personnel in 1958, and 859 thousand personnel and fourteen divisions (three of which were training divisions) in 1961. In addition, the Army budget decreased 50% from 1953 to 1955.⁵¹ The Army, mainly Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway, argued that there still existed a need for sufficient ground forces; not all conflicts would be nuclear and ground forces still had work to accomplish after a nuclear strike.⁵²

To counter the Ridgway's arguments, Secretary of the Treasury George T. Humphrey rebutted with the claim that “the US could not afford to maintain all kinds of forces assigned to fight in all kinds of wars.”⁵³ Ridgway's replacement, Maxwell Taylor reiterated that the United States needed a versatile Army to combat against guerrilla actions, small wars, and *coup d'etats*. He supported this argument with the formation of a division that could fight in limited level operations as well as on atomic battlefields.⁵⁴

Though the concept was never fully implemented, there were several important issues concerning the proposed revision. First, Army leaders tried to shift American focus away from Europe and the Cold War. They wanted to build a versatile Army capable of fighting

in a number of different environments. Second, they tried to devise a unit that was transportable. They understood that, with the Army decreasing in size, they could not afford to keep units worldwide. A deployable organization was more efficient.

2. FM 100-5: Operations, 1976

Though the Army learned many lessons in Vietnam, not many of them were officially entered incorporated into any doctrinal publication to affect organizational changes. An official study in 1960 indicated that “the tactical doctrine for the employment of regular forces against guerrilla forces has not been adequately developed and the Army does not have a clear concept of the proper scale and type of equipment necessary for these operations.”⁵⁵ Revisionists emphasized other issues to generate doctrine. They emphasized three primary reasons to substantiate the need for revised doctrine:

- The condition of the Army based on actions during Tet, Kent State, My Lai and perceptions of racial problems and drug abuse.
- A shift in defense in policy primarily centered around Nixon’s strategy of realistic deterrence.
- A relative decline in the defense budget (the 1973 budget represented a decrease relative to the GNP and the total federal budget).⁵⁶

They did not specifically concentrate on the lessons learned in the Vietnam Conflict. Like the Pentomic concepts, one of the biggest problems of a doctrine founded in the Vietnam conflict was a mental redirection and re-education for all officers and soldiers.

Furthermore, strategists’ orientation still remained in the east in a European NATO type conflict against the Soviet Union. Instead, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War provided the catalyst for change.

As a result of the studies of this conflict, the Army published the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5. The document was full of lessons from a predominately armor heavy conflict in a desert environment. Military planners agreed on a requirement for improved intelligence collection and analysis systems, different types and employment methods of air defense systems, and a tighter combination of armor and mechanized forces. In spite of the type of conflict the United States had just fought (Vietnam), this FM 100-5, like its predecessors, continued to maintain a European focus. It covered, in detail, various aspects of an active defense designed to stymie a massive Warsaw Pact breakthrough.

3. *AirLand Battle and the 1986 FM 100-5*

Whereas the 1976 version of FM 100-5 was extremely rigid and prescriptive, its successors were more conceptual. The 1986 version admitted the high risk associated with the concentration required for an active defense. Instead it advocated the concept of AirLand Battle: a deeper view of the battlefield requiring simultaneous strikes on attacking forces and their follow-on echelons.⁵⁷ The publication described the condition of “*auftragstaktik*: the inculcation in the battle leader of the ability to act independently as exigency required based on thorough training and a clear understanding of their commander’s intent.”⁵⁸ The most significant change was the addition of the operational level of war.

The authors conceded that United States Army in Europe maintained a strategic linear defense mindset versus an operational vision. In this environment, most required decision-making had already been completed through detailed war plans. However, conscious of this predicament, the authors still oriented on a “numerically superior and technology

advance Soviet/Warsaw pact front.”⁵⁹ The publication mentioned but did not emphasize involvement in other global contingencies.

4. *FM 100-5: Operations, 1993*

Based on lessons learned during the 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Army, once again, sought to revise its leading doctrinal manual. The focus of the 1993 version of FM 100-5 was on Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm. Even less prescriptive than the 1986 version, TRADOC and CGSC team members sought to develop a manual that conditioned the warrior’s mind to operate successfully in an ever-changing global environment. More than any of the preceding manuals, the publication sought to prepare military leaders for a full range of operations in which they might be involved, rather than focusing on a predominant contingency. To emphasize points stressed in the manual, the authors cited experiences the Army had in Panama and the Persian Gulf. Venues from Operation Just Cause were significant because they illustrated the “emerging concepts of depth and simultaneous attack.”⁶⁰ Desert Storm lessons were important because they covered a broad range of doctrinal issues including mobility, predeployment activities, deployment, entry operations, war termination, post conflict activities, redeployment, reconstitution, and demobilization.

New concepts introduced in the manual included full dimension operations, an emphasis on joint and combined operations, a revisitation of the fundamentals of Army operations, and the importance of the institution to exercise force projection.⁶¹ Pertinent to this study are the discussions on full dimension operations and force projection. The authors claim that commanders needed to be prepared to find themselves in operations

which include drug trafficking, insurgencies and extremists as well as conventional operations. They emphasized the requirement to exercise quick force projection in order to establish presence in vital areas. Intrinsically linked to both of these concepts was the vision of versatility: commanders must be able to rapidly shift from one type of operation to the next given the range of adversaries included on the Threat Spectrum.⁶²

The concept of versatility was important because of the size of the Army and the number of national interests at stake. The United States could not afford to occupy every area where it had national interests. However, a versatile Army could deploy to several areas where the country had interest. In addition, this type of Army could potentially respond to a wider range of threats.

B. Current US Interests in Korea and the Pacific Rim

The United States has maintained a military presence in South Korea since the signing of the armistice on 27 July 1953. At that time, the United States left military forces in the country to assist in the defense of South Korea. United States presence also signified a commitment to the accords of the Potsdam Agreement and stood as a deterrent to further North Korean aggression. However, the situation has changed dramatically over the last 44 years. Specifically, United States interests in the area and its allies have changed. This change in allies is indicative of changing interests of other Pacific Rim countries and US relations with many of these countries. Many of these changes are verbalized in the National Security and National Military Strategies.

1. Current United States Interest in the Region

To identify the current US interests in the Korean theater, one must look at those documents that formulate policy for that area. The 1996 version of the National Security Strategy states that the United States will achieve its goals through engagement and enlargement. The goals that the President would like to achieve include the following:

- To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad.
- To bolster America's economic revitalization.
- To promote democracy abroad.⁶³

To 'enhance security', the President wants to "maintain a military capability appropriately sized and postured to meet the diverse needs of our strategy."⁶⁴ He adds that he wants to maintain the capability to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts with the help of regional allies in concert with other instruments of national power. To 'bolster America's economy', he wants to promote prosperity at home by working "toward free and open market abroad." 'Promoting democracy' entails "protecting, consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies."⁶⁵

One method the President intends to use to enhance security is to "deploy US military forces abroad" and maintain permanently stationed overseas units.⁶⁶ In his goal to promote prosperity, he indicates that US "economic relations depend vitally on our ties with the Asia Pacific Region, which is the world's fastest growing economic area."⁶⁷ The President gives a special importance to promoting democracy abroad, stating that it impacts on economic prosperity and security.⁶⁸ However, he also admits that "democracy

and economic prosperity can take root in a struggling society only through local solutions carried out by the society itself.”⁶⁹

With respect to Asia, the NSS states that maintenance of 100,000 personnel in the area will contribute to regional stability. It maintains that the Korean Peninsula is the main threat to peace and stability in the region. The President claims that, of all the regional areas, the Pacific is the most important. Throughout the passage, the NSS cites several initiatives to solidify the area including the Asian Regional Forum (ARC) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum.⁷⁰

The 1995 National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the NSS “in concert with other elements of national power” by serving to “deter aggression and prevent conflict by convincing potential adversaries that their objectives will be denied and that their aggression will be decisively defeated.”⁷¹ The NMS claims that overseas presence of military forces facilitates performance of “a variety of activities that promote stability and prevent conflict” with “mobile combat ready forces capable of responding to a wide range of threats throughout the world.” Supporting this claim, it highlights those military forces permanently stationed in the region.

- South Korea - One Army Division and one combat aircraft wing.
- Japan - One Marine Expeditionary Force, one Army Special Forces battalion, 1.5 combat aircraft wings, one aircraft carrier and one amphibious ship.

The pamphlet does not specifically cover regional approaches like the NSS. However, interpolating the information in the document supports the same commitment to the Asian region as espoused in the NSS.

Thus, the two documents guiding the employment of military forces in support of national interests reflect a strong commitment to the Korean peninsula. The NSS explicitly states that one of the reasons for this commitment lies in the economic realm.

2. Economic Prosperity in the Pacific Rim

In her report "U. S. National Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region", D. Anne Martin provides quantifiable data which explains a newfound interest in the Pacific Region. Martin claims that, in 1988, the Asia-Pacific region accounted for 36% of world trade.⁷² She states that several factors are causing the United States to reevaluate its strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region, citing the closures of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station as significant revisions to its previous strategic foothold.⁷³ The loss of the bases is critical as the economic power of the area has been steadily increasing. In 1988, its portion of world trade was 15% higher than that of the European Economic Community.

Along with the Japanese, Martin gives credit to much of this economic emergence to a group she refers to as the Four Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong).⁷⁴ She adds a sense of urgency to the development of a coherent strategy for the area by highlighting South Korea's trading history with the Russia (\$100 million in 1986, \$600 million in 1989, and \$1 billion in 1991).

Furthermore, three of the Four Tigers enjoy healthy economies as indicated by their Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate. From 1986 to 1991, South Korea's real GDP averaged over 10% annually. It dipped to 5% in 1992, but rose to 6.3% in 1993 and 8.3% in 1994. Taiwan posted a 6% GDP growth rate in 1994 and Singapore checked in at

10.1%. Whereas Hong Kong recently dipped to 3.0% in 1990, it rose to 5.5% in 1994 and the country only had a 2% unemployment rate.⁷⁵

Though South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan enjoy democratic governments, Hong Kong, currently a dependent territory of Britain, is scheduled to revert to Chinese control in 1997. Several other countries in the area also enjoy healthy economies including Thailand. A democratically ruled country, Thailand has demonstrated a steady increase in growth rate from 1992 to 1994 with rates of 7.5%, 7.8%, and 8.0%.⁷⁶

Though the United States has had a promising economic partner in South Korea, several other countries in the region have demonstrated strong economic potential. In short, South Korea is no longer the only interest that the United States has in the Pacific Rim. North Korea is still a formidable threat, but other countries in the region are important to the United States, as well. It is important for the United States to develop a strategy capable of protecting its interests throughout the Pacific Rim. A strategy focusing solely on Korea will no longer suffice.

C. The Current Situation in North and South Korea

Like US Army doctrine and US interests in the Pacific Region, North and South Korea have undergone significant changes since 1953. The end of the Cold War and the global decay of communism have affected alliances in the area. In addition, North Korea isolationist philosophy has, to an outsider's view, had significant and detrimental effects on its social and political stability and well-being. A review of the current dispositions of the two countries, in terms of alliances, military, and economy, will facilitate a comparison

of their relative strengths and allow some forecast on their relative need for external military support.

1. South Korea

As stated previously, many of the non-communist governments in the area have been prospering economically for the last two decades. A healthy economy generates an expectation that the nation will do more for self-defense. South Korea is an excellent study of such a country. Economically, the country has been improving at an incredible rate. Analysts from Rand conducted an in-depth analysis of South Korea and developed several conclusions relative to its economy and military technological capabilities through the year 2000. Economically, the RAND team believes that:

- Whereas the South Korean economy was between 1/50 and 1/25 the size of the US GNP in 1980, it will be between 1/20 and 1/15 the size of the US economy by the year 2000.
- Whereas Korea's per-capita GNP was between 10 and 25 percent of the US per-capita GNP in 1980, Korea's per-capita will be between 28 and 40 percent of the corresponding US figure by 2000.
- Korean military spending is probably going to rise relative to that of the US, or at least to fall less rapidly in terms of the military spending share in GNP.⁷⁷

From a technological standpoint, the researchers also provide quantifiable evidence indicating greater capability in the military defense arena:

- During the 1980s, Korean research and development spending rose substantially relative to that of the United States.
- The number of scientists and engineers employed in R&D in Korea has risen considerably more rapidly than in the United States.
- Korea's "indigenization" of standard defense procurement has progressed, although reliance on high technology imports of defense items (e.g., helicopters, jet fighters) continues, but probably at a diminishing rate.⁷⁸

Other positive indicators of military progress include assumption of peacetime operational authority in December 1994. South Korea also increased its share of spending for Combined Forces Command from \$260 million in 1994 to \$300 million in 1995. This figure represents an 800% increase over its 1988 commitment of \$35 million.⁷⁹

However, internal social and political unrest pose a serious threat to South Korea's ability to maintain this progress. Whereas standard indicators of economic well-being, such as the GNP, demonstrate a favorable disposition, South Korea's internal problems are significant and may erupt into bigger problems. The country currently suffers from double digit inflation and housing prices are increasing at an alarming rate. A rise in the size of the lower class generates skepticism about the current political regime.⁸⁰

Dissatisfaction for political leadership is demonstrated through student agitation and extremism in farm and labor segments. Potentially, South Korea will need to alter its budgetary allotments, decreasing the amount currently allocated to defense spending while increasing that amount dedicated to its internal economic and domestic programs.⁸¹

Though South Korea has always been suspicious of the North, they have grown sympathetic to the North's current situation. A decision to send rice to North Korea in 1995 by President Kim Young Sam is credited with positioning him for a landslide victory in June 1995 elections.⁸²

2. North Korea

Conversely, in the North, the economy seems to be imploding. North Korea posted a negative growth rate for the fifth consecutive time in 1994. Currently, its economic pale in comparison to those of the South: GNP of \$21.2 billion is 1/18 of South's, Per Capita

of \$923 is only 1/9 of South's, and Two Way Trade of \$21.1 billion is only 1/95 of South's.⁸³ North Korea's economic despair has had a devastating impact on its domestic infrastructure. Inadequate energy supplies attributable to reduced oil imports led to a decrease in operation of industrial equipment to 28% of its optimum capacity. In 1994, imported oil amounted to 910,000 metric tons, only 26% of the country's total requirements. Whereas the country's electric power infrastructure has the capacity to generate 7.24 million kilowatts, it only generated 2.6 million kilowatts, only 64% of its requirements.⁸⁴

Adding to their domestic problems, North Korea experienced massive flooding in 1995. The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Assistance estimated that floods covered 75% of the country and destroyed 100,000 homes affecting 5 million people. The flooding also caused grain shortages in the amount of 2.6 million metric tons. The North Korean government relaxed their isolation policy in July 1995 by accepting 150,000 metric tons of grain from South Korea, 300,000 tons from Japan, and 150,000 tons from Thailand. Despite these crippling economic indicators, North Korea has continued to demonstrate signs of aggressiveness.⁸⁵

Intelligence sources indicate that North Korea maintains approximately 60% of its combat power within 100 miles of the DMZ. Intelligence experts also report that, despite its economic situation, North Korea has continued to conduct an aggressive military build-up. The North recently added 240 millimeter Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and 170 millimeter self-propelled howitzers to forces on the DMZ, and they are currently

developing improved version of the Silkworm and Daepo Dong 1 and 2 missiles. The Daepo Dong is estimated to have a range of between 2,000 and 4,500 kilometers.⁸⁶

North Korea's also demonstrated aggressive behavior during the nuclear production crisis of 1993 and 1994. Aware that the North Koreans built reactors capable of assisting in the production of nuclear munitions, Washington engaged in diplomatic talks with North Korean officials to dismantle the equipment in exchange for other hardware capable of supplementing the energy infrastructure. Having twice refused entrance to an international nuclear inspection team, North Korean officials, led by Park Yong Su, met with their counterparts to deliver the following message: "Seoul is not very far from here. Should a war break out, Seoul will be a sea of flames, and you, Mr. Song, will find it difficult to survive."⁸⁷ However, given the threat of US deployment of Patriot missiles to South Korea and a renewal of combined US/ROK military maneuvers, the North Koreans backed down, eventually submitting to the agreed framework in October 1994.

In accordance with the terms of the agreement, the US and North Korea agreed to work together for peace on the peninsula and North Korea promised to engage in North-South dialogue. Though the North has not yet fulfilled its dialogue promise, its deference to the US with respect to the threat of increased military activity constitutes a major success.

3. North versus South

Simply based on military strength in the 1950s, South Korea was at a distinct disadvantage to the North. However, as a result of changes over the last 45 years, the military dispositions of each country also changed significantly. South Korea has almost

reached parity with the North Korean forces in terms of ground combat and air force potential. Attachments 2 and 3, compiled by the Land Warfare Center, provide relative comparisons of North and South Korean ground and air forces. Attachments 2 and 3 are located on pages 45 and 46. They indicate equipment levels reported in 1995.

SECTION VI: Analysis of Research

An analysis of the previous sections reveals that several changes have occurred with respect to the United States position in South Korea during the past four decades. Though North Korea still remains a formidable threat to regional stability, the Army can support national interests in the region through other means. Issues supporting this claim include changes in national interests, Army doctrine, strength of North and South Korea, and the overall preparedness of the Army to respond to worldwide contingencies.

A. Interests Have Changed

In 1953, the major concern of the United States was to stop the spread of communism. The Soviet Union's actions in North Korea during the early 1950s marked the beginning of the Cold War. The United States opted to position military forces in South Korea to counteract Soviet and Soviet allies' aggressiveness.

In 1997, the Soviet Union no longer exists. Though the North Koreans have a strong military organization, they do not have the support they enjoyed in the 1950s. Instead of receiving military equipment from the Soviet Union and China, they rely on selling equipment to other Third World countries to support their decaying economy.

Furthermore, China no longer supports North Korea with arms sales because of the instability of the North Korean economy.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of global economy changed United States national interests in the Southwest Asian Region. The economic prosperity of the Pacific Rim offers new opportunities for economic trade. The United States is extremely interested in developing and sustaining long term trade agreements with several countries in the Pacific Rim including Japan, China, South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Singapore. A static defense along the 38th Parallel no longer supports protection of these emerging interests.

B. Army Doctrine Has Changed

Despite the experiences of WW II and Korea, the Army made few changes to its doctrine during the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the atomic era, Army planners attempted to devise a doctrine and an organization that could operate on an atomic battlefield and respond to the nation's needs. They also realized the importance of an organization that could deploy from the United States in response to a variety of missions. However, budget cuts and a resistance to change resulted in the termination of the Pentomic Concept. In spite of expanding interests and threats, the United States remained focused on Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Army has tried to form a versatile, deployable force for several decades. The 1993 FM 100-5 symbolizes the achievement of this goal. The value of the document is that it 1) shapes an Army that can respond to a variety of operations, and 2) does not fix

the Army in one location oriented on one threat. Force Projection is the key to its success.

The document is the product of several experiences that the Army had during the last ten years. These experiences include Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm/Desert Shield. The Cold War ended, revealing a whole new list of potential adversaries. The 1993 *Operations* manual is the Army's response to these new adversaries.

The current strategy in South Korea is reminiscent of the Army's fixation on the European theater during the Cold War period. Though several planners recognized the need to develop a versatile and responsive force, they could not draft a document capable of generating this change. A static defense in South Korea is a reminder of the difficulties the Army experienced in revising its doctrine over the last four decades. Now, planners should identify that a static defense in South Korea is no longer consistent with doctrine. Like the Cold War, this strategy expends valuable assets on one focus that could be satisfied through other means.

C. Economic and Military Changes in North and South Korea

In 1950, the South Korean military did not have the ability to defend the 38th parallel against the North Koreans. They lacked military equipment, adequate leadership, and combat experience. North Korea possessed the advantage in military strength by a 2:1 ratio. The only way that the South Koreans could repel a subsequent North Korean invasion was through military support from outside nations.

Since 1950, both North and South Korea have steadily improved their military capabilities. North Korea possesses one of the strongest military organizations in the world. However, South Korea almost has military parity with the North. Though South Korea has less equipment, its modernization program has exponentially improved the quality of its armed forces. In addition, with a more robust economy, South Korea can continue its emerging research and development programs at a faster rate than the North Koreans.

Indications are that South Korea can successfully defend for a long period of time against the North Koreans. A 1998 North Korean invasion of South Korea would not be a repeat of the 1950 invasion. South Korea could present a credible defense, certainly long enough for the United States to deploy military forces from CONUS to terminate Northern aggression.

SECTION VII: Recommendations and Conclusion

The decision to deploy American troops to South Korea in 1950 was a good one. American interests were at stake. Having just fought World War II, the United States was concerned about the spread of communism and the Soviet intentions. The defense of South Korea was vital to maintaining a security arc around the United States' western interests. The area also offered key terrain should the United States engage the Soviet Union (Vladivostok and control of the Sea of Japan).

In addition, the deployment was consistent with American doctrine. The United States had broken out of its isolationist strategy and had, within the previous three decades,

deployed on two occasions to Europe in support of American interests. Military planners knew that the South Korean military was no match for the North Koreans. The only way to stem the spread of communist influence was to assist in the defense of South Korea.

After the war, the United States planned to reduce the size of the United States military force in South Korea, but there was no coherent plan to accomplish this operation. Political administrators wanted to reduce the size of United States military forces while increasing the self-defense capabilities of the South Korean military. However, United States policymakers did not have any milestone to support this plan nor did they establish any measures of success to facilitate this plan. Subsequently, South Korean government had a lot of influence on the reduction of American military forces in the region. As a result of these influences, American strategy in Korea is no longer consistent with doctrine, national interests, and South Korean capabilities.

This disconnect is the result of several changes. Changes occurred in doctrine, national security strategy and South Korea. The following table illustrates these changes.

Change	Indicators
Army doctrine has evolved from containment to force projection	Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Provide Relief
National interests have changed from stopping the spread of communism into South Korea to protecting vital economic interests in the Pacific Rim.	Statements included in the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Regional Analyses.
At the time of the Korean War, South Korea was unable to defend against a North Korean invasion. Today, South Korea has relative military parity with the North.	Regional analysis demonstrating an overall increase in the size of South Korea's military, an dramatic increase in research and development, and the country's performance in the Vietnam Conflict.

The result of these changes is that the United States needs to revise its strategy concerning the defense of South Korea. The author does not mean to minimize the North Korean threat. However, the current disposition of United States military forces in South Korea no longer supports interests in the region and is not consistent with Army doctrine. Furthermore, South Korea is capable of defending itself until American forces arrive from outside the country to provide support.

To rectify these deficiencies, the author presents two options concerning military strategy in South Korea. These options are support national interests in the Pacific Region, are consistent with doctrine, and enable South Korea to defend itself with the assurance of any required United States support.

Option 1: Base United States Army Forces in Pusan	Option 2: Contingency Force deploys from Hawaii
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2nd Infantry Division and Eighth Army relocate to Pusan. • Develop contingencies for the defense of South Korea and deployment to other areas of the Pacific Rim. • USCINCPAC relocated to Korea. • South Korea assumes responsibility for defense of the 38th Parallel. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United States Army forces redeploy from South Korea. • POMCUS and APA positioned to support contingency operations on the peninsula. • Develop contingencies for deployment of Army forces from Hawaii to South Korea and other vital area in the Pacific Rim. • South Korea assumes responsibility for defense of the 38th Parallel.

These options represent a radical shift in the strategy the United States has used in South Korea. However, they support national interests in the region and they are consistent with current Army doctrine. Furthermore, they give South Korea the

responsibility for its own self-defense. In concert with either of these options, the United States could use other instruments of national power to influence the reunification of the two Koreas under a democratic government.

In his recent White Paper, *Force of Decision*, Chief of Staff of the Army General Dennis Reimer highlighted that “from 1990 until the present, the defense budget has decreased 38%, the force has been reduced 35%, and worldwide missions have increased 300%”.⁸⁸ Furthermore, in 1995, “on any given day . . . the Army averaged 20,000 soldiers deployed in over 80 countries.”⁸⁹ This involvement has significantly increased the types of adversaries the United States may oppose. The United States can no longer afford to station an infantry division in South Korea with the single mission of defending between the 38th Parallel and Seoul. The Army must develop a force for the Pacific Rim which is deployable and capable of responding to other threats.

Attachment 1: Evolution of Army Doctrine

Doctrine	Timeframe	Stimulus	Effects on Army
Post WWII	1945-1950	World War II	Fixation on Atomic munitions Increase in service parochialism Emphasis on combined arms Powerful, offensively oriented
Korean War	1950-1953	Korean War	Affirmed previous doctrine Withdrawals become part of ops Begin to incorporate night attacks Move to area defense
Pentomic Division	1954-1959	Nuclear Weapons Military Budget Cuts	Emphasized dispersion on battlefield Versatility of Army Army to assume strategic mobility from Air Force Need for greater strategic mobility
ROAD	1959-1960		Emphasis on modular design of division Still needed versatility to fight in numerous environments Increase in aviation assets in division Establishment of support commands and logistics commander Offensive operations relatively the same, defense emphasizes area & mobile defense
Counterinsurgency and Vietnam	1960-1973	Korean War N. Korean Guerrilla Tactics	Problems incurred with mental redirection and re-education Emphasized non-linear and multidirectional operations Change in offensive = emphasis on firepower and decrease on infantry assaults
FM 100-5: 1976	1976-1983	Arab-Israeli War	Perceived an increase in Army readiness and discipline Realization that capability to deter is limited ("1.5 MRCs") Based on strategy of realistic deterrence Emphasis on active defense suitable to European theater
FM 100-5: 1983/1986	1983-1993		Included operational level of war Corps must think operationally Recognized overemphasis on defense - Army not offensively spirited 'Cognizant' of global contingencies
FM 100-5: 1993	1993-Present	Desert Shield/Storm	Demonstrated acceptance of full dimension operations No continuing on Soviet threat Based on lessons of Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm Strategic Deployability cornerstone to reaction to threat spectrum

Attachment 2: Comparison of North and South Korean Ground Combat Potential

North and South Korean Ground Forces: Gross Numbers and Combat Potential

Category	North Korea		South Korea	
	Numbers	DFP*	Numbers	DFP*
Infantry Squads	14229	12806	5508	4958
Main Battle Tanks	3700	5920	1900	5378
Light Tanks	500	400	0	0
Armored Infantry				
Fighting Vehicles	0	0	1500	1950
Armored Personnel				
Carriers	2500	2500	500	572
Towed Artillery	2300	5290	3500	9660
Self-Propelled				
Artillery	4500	12150	900	5340
Multiple Rocket				
Launchers	2280	2964	140	1540
Mortars	9000	9360	6000	7200
Surface-to-Surface				
Missile Launchers	84	134	12	11
Antitank Guided				
Weapons	500	325	500	500
Antitank Guns	1500	450	208	72
Air Defense Guns	8800	880	600	120
Surface-to-Air				
Missile Launch	10300	<u>278</u>	1020	<u>734</u>
Subtotal Ground		53457		38038
Force Potential				
US Ground Forces in				
South Korea				<u>1588</u>
Total Ground Force				
Potential		53457		
39626 ⁹⁰				

* Number from IISS *Military Balance 1994-1995*. Effectiveness measure in terms of TASCFORM "Designated Force Potential."

Attachment 3: Comparison of North and South Korean Air Force Potential

North and South Korean Air Forces: Numbers of Aircraft and Combat Potential

Category	North Korea		South Korea	
	Numbers of Aircraft	DFP*	Numbers of Aircraft	DFP*
Bombers	80	536	0	0
Ground Attack				
Fighters	330	1172	238	2337
Air Superiority				
Fighters	360	3740	119	1642
Attack Helicopters	<u>50</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>133</u>	<u>231</u>
Subtotal Air				
Power	820	5548	447	4210
US Air Forces in				
South Korea			72	<u>1130</u>
Total Air Power				
Potential		5548		5340 ⁹¹

* Number from IISS *Military Balance 1994-1995*. Effectiveness measure in terms of TASCFORM "Designated Force Potential."

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